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Te Misuse or Abuse Exception: Te
Role of Economic Substance
Jinyan Li*

Introduction
Te “misuse or abuse” exception under subsection 245(4) of the Income Tax Act 1
draws the line between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance. As a “safety
valve” 2 or “relieving provision,” 3 this exception has proved to be the “most crucial
and controversial single factor in the application of the GAAR.” 4 Whether a transaction that lacks economic substance is subject to the general anti-avoidance rule
(GAAR) is the question considered in this chapter.
Te current law on economic substance is unsettled, to put it optimistically.
In Canada Trustco,5 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the relevance of
economic substance depends on “the proper interpretation of specifc provisions

* Professor, co-director of LLM Tax Program, Osgoode Hall Law School. I thank Scott Wilkie for
sharing his insights into the importance of legal substance and economic substance; Taddeus
Hwong for providing feedback on an earlier draft of this chapter; and Nathan Jin Bao and
Corey LeBlanc (Osgoode JD students) for providing excellent research assistance.
1 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”).
2 Brian J. Arnold, “Policy Forum: Te Determination of Abuse under GAAR” (2014) 62:1
Canadian Tax Journal 113-27, at 115; Douglas J. Powrie, “GAAR: Its Evolution and Application,”
in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Second Tax Conference, 2009 Conference Report (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011), 8:1-32, at 8:2.
3 David A. Dodge, “A New and More Coherent Approach to Tax Avoidance” (1988) 36:1
Canadian Tax Journal 1-22, at 20.
4 Brian J. Arnold, “General Overview of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule,” in chapter 5 of this
volume.
5 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, at paragraphs 56 and 57; af ’g 2004 FCA
67; af ’g 2003 TCC 215. For a critique of this case, see Brian J. Arnold, “Policy Forum:
Confusion Worse Confounded—Te Supreme Court’s GAAR Decisions” (2006) 54:1 Canadian
Tax Journal 167-209.
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of the Act or the relevant factual context of a case.” 6 Te court provided little
guidance, however, on how such relevance should be determined. No other Supreme
Court decisions have addressed economic substance per se. Recent Federal Court
of Appeal cases have recognized that the foundational provisions of the Act (such
as sections 3, 4, 9, and 38) require transactions to have some air of economic reality,
and these cases have not recognized losses resulting from paper transactions.7 Te
only clear judicial guidance is that a requirement of economic substance is not a
stand-alone anti-abuse rule, and that a lack of economic substance is not a proxy
for abuse. In short, the pre-GAAR judicial approach to statutory interpretation
and the construction of facts seems to persist, which could undermine the intended
purpose and efect of the GAAR.
Tis chapter deals with economic substance as a matter of statutory interpretation. “Economic substance” refers to an economic (non-tax) purpose and an
economic (non-tax) result or efect. I suggest in this chapter that in all abuse cases,
economic substance should be considered in order to give efect to the purpose
of the GAAR. More specifcally, I propose that a unifed purposive approach should
apply to the construction of both the law and the facts, and that specifc provisions
of the Act should receive an “organic” interpretation—that is, an interpretation
that is sensitive to the typology of the provision and the provision’s organic evolution and relationship with other provisions. Further, I suggest that the relevance
of economic substance depends on the provision’s intent. For a revenue-raising
provision (that is, a provision that is part of the scheme designed to raise tax
revenue), a transaction lacking economic substance is presumptively abusive. For
a tax-expenditure provision or a specifc anti-avoidance rule (SAAR), the economic
efect of an avoidance transaction is tested against the intended efect of the provision: if the efect of the transaction falls outside the intended scope of a taxexpenditure provision or falls within the intended scope of a SAAR, abuse will
likely be found.
Following this introduction, the next section of this chapter provides a critical
overview of the role of the GAAR and the current state of the law on economic
substance. Next, the chapter makes the case for considering economic substance
through a disciplined and rigorous exercise of statutory interpretation. A typology
of the substantive provisions of the Act is established (namely, revenue-raising
provisions, tax-incentive provisions, and SAARs), followed by an explanation of the
various ways in which economic substance is relevant to diferent types of provisions. Te chapter concludes with an analysis of the Canada Trustco case, showing
how the approach proposed in this chapter would have worked in that case.

6 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 60 (SCC).
7 See, for example, Triad Gestco Ltd. v. Canada, 2012 FCA 258 and Canada v. Global Equity Fund
Ltd., 2012 FCA 272.
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Te GAAR and Judicial Approaches to
Economic Substance
Te GAAR’s Transformative Role
A NEW DIRECTION FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Section 245 signifed “a new approach to tax avoidance in Canada,” 8 and it was
adopted because the government had become convinced that a change in direction
was required to reduce aggressive tax avoidance and to protect the tax base and
the fairness of the tax system.9 Tis new direction is evident in subsections 245(3)
and 245(4).
Subsection 245(3) defnes an “avoidance transaction” by reference to a taxpayer’s
primary purpose, which is established on the basis of objective facts. In efect, by
enacting the GAAR, Parliament sought to initiate a paradigm shift for construing
facts or transactions for tax purposes: it was thought that the traditional approach—legalistic, form-over-substance, and transaction-by-transaction—must
give way to a purposive construction of the facts through an examination of the
purpose motivating the legal form used and the transactions in a series of transactions. Te impetus for this paradigm shift was the Supreme Court’s rejection of
the business purpose test in Stubart 10 and the fact that post-Stubart tax planning
had not been afected by the court’s adoption of the modern rule of statutory
interpretation.11
Subsection 245(4) requires a purposive construction of tax statutes (the Act,
regulations, and tax treaties) through the misuse or abuse test.12 Tis is not a new
direction, since the purposive-interpretation approach (that is, the modern rule of
statutory interpretation) had already been adopted in Stubart. Subsection 245(4),
however, elevates a judicial doctrine into a legislative test, with the aim of nudging
the courts to play a greater role in addressing aggressive tax avoidance. Tis has
been perceived by some judges as imposing an “unusual duty of going behind the
words of the legislation to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision
or provisions relied upon by the taxpayer.” 13
8 Dodge, supra note 3, at 2.
9 Canada, Department of Finance, Te White Paper: Tax Reform 1987 (Ottawa: Department of
Finance, June 18, 1987).
10 Stubart Investments Ltd. v. Te Queen, [1984] 1 SCR 536.
11 Dodge, supra note 3, at 18. See also Deen Olsen and Perry Derksen, “Te Historical Legal
Context for the Enactment of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Judicial Anti-Avoidance
Doctrines and Statutory Anti-Avoidance Rules,” in chapter 2 of this volume.
12 Te GAAR does not give the judiciary the duty or power to “legislate” by flling legislative gaps or
imputing a special overarching meaning to undefned expressions such as “income,” “proft,” or
“loss.” See Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 41 (SCC), and Global Equity, supra note 7,
at paragraph 59.
13 Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63, at paragraph 66.
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Section 245 requires a determination of the purpose of both statutory provisions
and taxpayers’ transactions. In efect, Parliament has legislated a coherent approach
to interpreting the facts and the law while preserving taxpayers’ entitlement to
beneft from legislative ambiguity and the right to minimize taxation.
Tis coherent approach—and the corresponding end of the incoherent judicial
approach—is perhaps the most profound efect of the GAAR. Where a taxpayer’s
purpose is to defeat or undermine Parliament’s purpose, the GAAR ensures that
Parliament’s purpose prevails. Te key to this approach is to decipher Parliament’s
purpose when the provisions of the Act are read as a whole or when a specifc
provision is interpreted textually and contextually.
A REMINDER OF THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT

Protecting the tax base (that is, maintaining revenue-raising capacity) and protecting the fairness of the tax system are the primary stated objectives of the GAAR.14
Tus the GAAR reminds us that these purposes are fundamental to the Act itself,
evident in its origin, architecture, and evolution.15 Te Income War Tax Act (IWTA)
was frst enacted in 1917 to raise revenue and to fairly share among Canadians
the collective burden of fnancing the First World War.16 Te Act remains the most
important instrument for raising revenue in Canada.17
Fairness has long been the bedrock of the income tax system. Te notion of
fairness in tax law can be understood as having two aspects: a substantive sense
of fairness, refecting the principle of ability to pay and distributive justice; and
procedural fairness, refecting the rule of law and taxpayers’ right to have tax laws
that are certain and predictable. Te IWTA became the Income Tax Act in 1948,
when income tax was understood to have become a “mass” or “democratic” tax.18

14 Canada, Department of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income Tax (Bill C-139)
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, June 1988), at clause 186; Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at
paragraph 60 (SCC).
15 Jinyan Li and J. Scott Wilkie, “Celebrating the Centennial of the Income War Tax Act, 1917: Te
Future Seen by the Light of 100 Candles,” in Jinyan Li, J. Scott Wilkie, and Larry F. Chapman,
eds., Income Tax at 100 Years: Essays and Refections on the Income War Tax Act (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 2017), 1:1-18.
16 Colin Campbell and Robert Raizenne, “Te 1917 Income War Tax Act: Origins and Enactment,”
in Income Tax at 100 Years, supra note 15, 2:1-96; Income War Tax Act, SC 1917, c. 28 (herein
referred to as “the 1917 IWTA”).
17 Income tax revenues account for 67.3 percent of total revenues of Canada in the 2018-19 fscal
year: see “Public Accounts of Canada,” included in Canada, Department of Finance, “Annual
Financial Report of the Government of Canada Fiscal Year 2018-2019” (www.canada.ca/en/
department-finance/services/publications/annual-financial-report/2019/report.html).
18 Colin Campbell, “J.L. Ilsley and the Transition to the Post-War Tax System: 1943-1946” (2015)
63:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-52.
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When capital gains became taxable under the 1972 Act, fairness based on the
ability-to-pay principle was a key justifcation for the change. Te Carter report
states:
Unless a tax system is generally accepted as fair, the fundamental purpose of taxation is
lost; for if fairness is not considered relevant there are certainly simpler means for the
government to secure command over goods and services . . . it is also clear from the
record of the past that a social and political system cannot be strong and enduring when
a people becomes convinced that its tax structure does not distribute the tax burden
fairly among all citizens.19

Parliament frequently uses the Act not only as a means of raising revenue fairly
but also as a policy instrument for providing incentives to taxpayers or for implementing income-support programs, such as the Canada child beneft. “[T]axing
statutes,” as the Tax Court has said, “have economic and social objectives that far
transcend the mere raising of money.” 20 Tus, the Act has a “dual aspect”; it is
both a revenue-raising device and a policy instrument for spending money.21
Tese purposes are rarely explicitly stated by Parliament, but they are evident
in the Act, embedded in the wording and arrangement of its provisions and coming
into view when the GAAR is deployed.

Te Judicial Approach to Economic Substance
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

About half of the GAAR cases decided since 1997 have found the GAAR applicable.
Among these cases are Mathew,22 Lipson,23 and Copthorne,24 all decided by the
Supreme Court. Revenue-raising provisions and SAARs are the provisions most
commonly found to have been abused (see the appendix to this chapter).25 Te

19 Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol. 2
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) (hereinafter the “Carter report”), at 17.
20 Hover v. MNR, 93 DTC 98 (TCC), at 99.
21 Stubart, supra note 10, at paragraph 55.
22 Mathew v. Canada, 2005 SCC 55 (also known as Kaulius v. Te Queen, 2005 DTC 5538 (SCC)).
23 Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1.
24 Copthorne, supra note 13. For further discussion of Canada Trustco, Mathew, and Copthorne, and
of selected GAAR decisions of provincial courts and the Federal Court of Appeal, see Brian R.
Carr, Brittany Finn, and Ryan Wolfe, “GAAR: An Economic Test?—Te Courts Divide,”
Corporate Tax Planning feature (2020) 68:1 Canadian Tax Journal 351-90.
25 As shown in the appendix to this chapter, the abused provisions are SAARs (14 cases), tax-raising
provisions (14 cases), and technical relief/facilitation provisions (2 cases). Note that some cases
involve two types of provisions. Tere are no abuse cases involving tax-incentive or social
income-support provisions. Te provisions most often abused are those relating to surplus
stripping (sections 84, 84.1, and 212.1, and subsection 87(3) (text in parentheses)), loss
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only Supreme Court case that directly addressed the issue of economic substance
was Canada Trustco.
In Canada Trustco, the taxpayer bought trailers for Cdn$120 million from a
US corporation, Transamerica Leasing Inc. (TLI), primarily with borrowed money.
Te trailers were “circuitously leased back” to TLI.26 Te taxpayer claimed capital
cost allowance (CCA) and deducted interest expense, resulting in losses that were
used to ofset other income. Miller J of the Tax Court found that the transactions
were “not so dissimilar from an ordinary sale-leaseback” and were a “proftable
investment in a commercial context.” 27 Although he also found the transactions
to be avoidance transactions because the obtaining of the CCA deduction “drove
the deal,” he concluded that there was no abuse of the CCA provisions. Miller J’s
decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal (orally) in a fve-sentence decision, and by a unanimous Supreme Court.28
In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court interpreted the CCA provisions as requiring only cost—not “economic cost”—and held that cost “in the context of CCA
is a well-understood legal concept.” 29 Te court stated that “the documents detailing the transaction left no uncertainty as to the relationships between the parties”
and the “relationships between the parties as expressed in the relevant documentation were not superfuous elements; they were the very essence of the transaction.” 30
Te court upheld the Tax Court’s conclusion that the tax beneft derived from the
avoidance transactions fell within the purpose of the CCA provisions. With respect
to the relevance of economic substance in general, the Supreme Court referred to
the statement in the explanatory notes that “the provisions of the Income Tax Act
are intended to apply to transactions with real economic substance,” 31 and the
court emphasized the importance of statutory interpretation:
Although the expression “economic substance” may be open to diferent interpretations, this statement recognizes that the provisions of the Act were intended to apply to
transactions that were executed within the object, spirit and purpose of the provisions
that are relied upon for the tax beneft.32

limitation (subsection 18(3)), income shifting (section 74.1 and subsections 75(2) and 100(1)),
and computation of income (sections 3, 4, 9, 111, 80, and 83, and subsection 20(16)). Te two
technical relief provisions abused are subsection 112(1) and clause 256(7)(b)(iii)(B)).
26 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 2 (TCC).
27 Ibid., at paragraphs 89 and 57 (TCC).
28 Canada Trustco, supra note 5.
29 Ibid., at paragraph 75 (SCC).
30 Ibid., at paragraph 76 (SCC).
31 Ibid., at paragraphs 47, 56, and 57 (SCC).
32 Ibid., at paragraph 56 (SCC).
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Although the explanatory notes make reference to the expression “economic
substance,” section 245(4) does not consider a transaction to result in abusive tax
avoidance merely because an economic or commercial purpose is not evident. As
previously stated, the GAAR was not intended to outlaw all tax benefts; Parliament
intended for many to endure. Te central question is whether the transaction was
consistent with the purpose of the provisions of the Income Tax Act that are relied
on by the taxpayer, when those provisions are properly interpreted in light of their
context. Abusive tax avoidance will be established if the transactions frustrate or
defeat those purposes.33
Te Supreme Court did not indicate whether the avoidance transactions had
economic substance, although the implication was that they did, because the court
found that the transactions were similar to “ordinary sale-leaseback” transactions.
Te decision seemed to suggest, however, that economic substance is not refected
in the CCA provisions because “cost” is a legal concept. A logical inference to draw
from the decision is that even tax-driven transactions lacking economic substance
can beneft from CCA deductions and be saved from the application of the GAAR
by subsection 245(4).
Te other three Supreme Court GAAR cases concern the abuse of SAARs, none
of which explicitly refer to economic substance. In Mathew, the avoidance transactions were considered to be artifcial and vacuous and to have resulted in shifting
losses in a context where the combined efect of subsection 18(13) and section 96
is not to allow taxpayers “to preserve and transfer unrealized losses to arm’s length
parties.” 34 In Lipson, LeBel J found that the avoidance transactions abused subsection 74.1(1) because they used an anti-avoidance rule to achieve a tax-avoidance
result.35 In Copthorne, Rothstein J illuminated the process of textual, contextual,
and purposive interpretation by considering the text of subsection 87(3) and a
broad range of “contextual clues,” 36 including the paid-up capital (PUC) scheme,
the absence of corporate consolidation, the relevance of the statutory scheme for
capital gains, the in rem nature of PUC, the rules to prevent artifcial increases in
PUC, and the interpretive principle of negative implication (inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius). He concluded that the purpose of subsection 87(3) is “to preclude the
preservation of PUC, upon amalgamation, where such preservation would allow a
shareholder, on a redemption of shares by the amalgamated corporation, to be paid
amounts without liability for tax in excess of the investment of tax-paid funds” 37
(or double-counting the PUC in the subsidiary corporation that is amalgamated

33
34
35
36

Ibid., at paragraph 57 (SCC).
Mathew, supra note 22, at paragraph 55.
Lipson, supra note 23, at paragraph 42.
Tis expression was used by Stratas J in Te Queen v. Lehigh Cement Limited, 2014 FCA 103, at
paragraph 52.
37 Copthorne, supra note 13, at paragraph 126.
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with its parent). Since PUC represents “tax-paid funds” invested by a shareholder
in a corporation, the artifcial infation of the PUC through the avoidance transactions is abusive.
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court decisions suggest that economic substance is not a stand-alone test for abuse, but that artifcial or vacuous transactions
are abusive.
THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL DECISIONS

None of the post-Canada Trustco GAAR decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal
explicitly consider economic substance. However, the economic nature of taxdeductible losses was considered in Triad Gestco,38 1207192 Ontario Ltd.,39 Global
Equity,40 and 2763478 Canada Inc.;41 the economic interest of a partner in a
partnership was considered in 594710 British Columbia Inc.;42 and a terminal loss
in the CCA scheme was considered to be a real economic loss in Landrus.43 Te
Tax Court also considered, in Pièces automobiles Lecavalier, the economic nature of
the gain of a debtor under section 80.44 Even though the term “economic loss” or
“economic beneft” was not used in the relevant provisions, the courts, guided by
the principle of purposive interpretation, deciphered a legislative purpose as both
allowing a deduction of economic losses and taxing economic benefts.
Te deciphering process adopted by Noël J in Triad Gestco and 2763478 Canada
Inc. and by Mainville J in Global Equity is illuminating. Tese cases concern the
deduction of pure paper losses generated by value-shifting transactions, and they
involve the interpretation of some of the most basic provisions of the Act: paragraph
3( b) in Triad Gestco and 2763478 Canada Inc., and paragraph 3(d ) and sections 9
and 111 in Global Equity. In Triad Gestco, Noël J considered the following statutory
scheme for capital gains and losses: 45
• a charging rule in paragraph 3( b);
• computational rules under paragraphs 38( b), 39(1)(b), and 40(1)(b), and
defnitional rules in section 53;
• special rules to deem a realization of gains or losses on a change of use under
section 45 and subsection 13(2);

38 Triad Gestco, supra note 7.
39 1207192 Ontario Limited v. Canada, 2012 FCA 259.
40 Global Equity, supra note 7.
41 2763478 Canada Inc. v. Canada, 2018 FCA 209.
42 Canada v. 594710 British Columbia Ltd., 2018 FCA 166.
43 Canada v. Landrus, 2009 FCA 113.
44 Pièces automobiles Lecavalier Inc. v. Te Queen, 2013 TCC 310.
45 Triad Gestco, supra note 7, at paragraphs 26-36.
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• stop-loss rules under subparagraph 40(2)(g)(iii) and subsection 40(3.4) to
deny the recognition of losses where property is not disposed of by the
taxpayer or continues to be owned by the same economic unit (the taxpayer
and an afliated person);
• policy-oriented rules, such as fowthrough share rules under section 66.1;
and
• loss-carryover rules under section 111.
Noël J considered paragraph 3( b) to be the “root” of the scheme.46 He noted
that this provision was introduced in 1972, on the recommendation of the Carter
Commission, to tax capital gains as “a form of enrichment.” 47 Te stop-loss rules
are SAARs48 that are intended to preclude a taxpayer from claiming tax relief for
a capital loss. Although the change-of-use rules “facilitate” the transition between
diferent uses of property, and the fowthrough share rules “encourage” resource
and mineral exploration, these rules do not “detract from the underlying policy”
refected in the basic charging rules.49 Te object, spirit, and purpose of the basic
rules ( paragraphs 3( b), 38( b), 39(1)(b), and 40(1)(b)) do not allow a paper loss
to be deducted as an allowable capital loss.50
Noël J’s conclusion about the purpose of paragraph 3( b) and its supporting
rules is grounded in a “real-world,” as opposed to a make-believe, view of the
income tax system; 51 it appreciates the fact that capital gains mean an increase in
economic power and are not afected by paper losses,52 and that statutory interpretation is not a “mechanical exercise.” 53
Mainville J adopted a similar approach in Global Equity. He considered sections 3, 4, 9, and 111 to be “basic provisions of the Act”: 54
• Section 3 provides the “basic mechanism for determining a taxpayer’s income
for a taxation year.”

46 2763478 Canada Inc, supra note 41, at paragraph 54.
47 Ibid., at paragraph 53.
48 Triad Gestco, supra note 7, at paragraph 33.
49 Ibid., at paragraphs 47-49.
50 2763478 Canada Inc., supra note 41, at paragraph 61.
51 In Triad Gestco, supra note 7, at paragraph 41, Noël J stated: “In this regard, the comment of the
House of Lords in WT Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1981] 1 All ER 865,
although it was made by reference to capital gain under UK Law, is entirely apposite (p. 873):
‘Te capital gains tax was created to operate in the real world, not that of make-believe. As I said
in Aberdeen Construction Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comrs, [1978] 1 All ER 962 at 996, [1978] AC
885 at 893, [1978] STC 127 at 131, it is a tax on gains.’ ”
52 Triad Gestco, supra note 7, at paragraph 42.
53 Ibid., at paragraph 39.
54 Global Equity, supra note 7, at paragraph 53.
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• Section 4 sets out a source-by-source requirement for computing income or
loss.
• Section 9 provides that income or loss from a business or property is the
proft or loss therefrom.
• Section 111 allows a taxpayer to carry over certain losses, including business
losses.
Because “income,” “proft,” and “loss” are undefned in the Act, Mainville J gave
a coherent and “common-sense” interpretation of “proft” under subsection 9(1)
and “loss” under subsection 9(2), referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Canderel: “In seeking to ascertain proft, the goal is to obtain an accurate picture
of the taxpayer’s proft for the year.” 55 Te commonsense principle for the meaning
of proft applies equally to losses, and business losses must have “an air of economic or business reality.” Terefore, the fundamental rationale underlying these
provisions is that “business losses must be grounded in some form of economic
or business reality.” 56
Te “real-world” view embraced by Mainville J is refreshing:
Like the proverbial rabbit out of the magician’s hat, the loss which occurred as a result
of these transactions was pulled out of thin air. Tese transactions are nothing more
than a paper shufe carried out with the purpose of creating an artifcial business loss for
the purpose of avoiding the payment of taxes otherwise owed on the profts resulting
from the real-world business operations of [the taxpayer].57

Does this real-world view require transactions to have economic substance,
and, if so, how much substance is sufcient? In Triad Gestco and Global Equity,
the paper-shufing arrangements resulted in no meaningful change in the economic
position of the taxpayers and were considered to be artifcial and vacuous. Since
tax planning is often an intrinsic part of “real-world business operations,” how
much guidance can be gleaned from these decisions?
THE UNSETTLED STATE OF THE LAW

Te current state of the law on economic substance is unsettled. Although the
courts have made it clear that economic substance is relevant in a GAAR analysis,
they have not yet provided guidance on when it is relevant. Only in an extreme
scenario where the avoidance transaction is artifcial or vacuous (that is, void of
any economic purpose or efect)—for example, a transaction that generates paper
losses—does the idea of a transaction’s economic substance seem to play a role in
determining whether the transaction was abusive.

55 Ibid., at paragraph 62, quoting paragraph 53 of Canderel Ltd. v. Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 147.
56 Global Equity, supra note 7, at paragraphs 62 and 63.
57 Ibid., at paragraph 67.
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Te current state of the law on economic substance is also confusing about the
approach to discerning legislative purpose. In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court
stated that the provisions of the Act “are intended to apply to transactions with
real economic substance,” but it also stated that “[i]n general, Parliament confers
tax benefts under the Income Tax Act to promote purposes related to specifc activities.” 58 Tis seems to imply that avoiding tax by taking advantage of tax benefts
through avoidance transactions would be, “in general,” intended by Parliament.
Tis amounts to confating tax-raising provisions and tax-beneft-conferring (tax
relief or tax expenditure) provisions.
Te Canada Trustco decision is arguably incorrect in its approach to the abuse
analysis, given its suggestion that the form or documentation of an avoidance
transaction is assessed in relation to the purpose or rationale of the relevant statutory provision:
[A]busive tax avoidance may be found where the relationships and transactions as expressed in the relevant documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax beneft, or where they are
wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions that are contemplated by the
provisions.59

Tis “wholly dissimilar” test 60 has no legislative or contextual basis. If applied
indiscriminately, it could render economic substance irrelevant because few provisions of the Act explicitly require transactions to have economic substance. Tis
approach is tantamount to continuing the pre-GAAR approach to applying the
Act. It is true that the Supreme Court did not follow this incoherent approach in
Mathew, Lipson, and Copthorne, but the court did not reject it, either.

Economic Substance as a Matter of Statutory
Interpretation
Te Notion of Economic Substance
Te notion of economic substance is undefned in the Act and in the jurisprudence.
It can be understood to refer both to an economic ( business or bona fde non-tax)
purpose and to an economic efect of a transaction.61 Te term “economic purpose”

58 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 15 (SCC).
59 Ibid., at paragraph 60 (SCC) (emphasis added).
60 See Arnold, “Confusion Worse Confounded,” supra note 5, at 194.
61 For more on economic substance, see Jinyan Li, “ ‘Economic Substance’: Drawing the Line
Between Legitimate Tax Minimization and Abusive Tax Avoidance” (2006) 54:1 Canadian Tax
Journal 23-56; Robert McMechan, Economic Substance and Tax Avoidance: An International
Perspective (Toronto: Carswell, 2013); and Leandra Lederman, “W(h)ither Economic Substance?”
(2010) 95:2 Iowa Law Review 389-444.
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is used in contrast to a tax-avoidance purpose. Te purpose test in the GAAR, as set
out in subsection 245(3), requires a bona fde purpose other than the purpose of
obtaining a tax beneft. Te notion of economic efect, in contrast to legal efect,
is used to refer to the economic results of a transaction: that is, to address the
question whether a transaction brings about a meaningful change in the economic
position of the parties. Tis aspect of economic substance is missing from section
245 on its face, but its relevance can be gathered from the GAAR jurisprudence that
considers the economic nature of income or loss, and from the fact that (for example)
PUC means “tax-paid funds” and capital gains represent economic enrichment.
Bifurcating economic substance into an economic purpose and an economic
efect or result may help explain its relevance in the context of diferent types of
provisions. For the purposes of analyzing the abuse of revenue-raising provisions,
both prongs of economic substance are relevant. For the purposes of analyzing the
abuse of tax-expenditure provisions or SAARs, the economic efect is more relevant.
Considering the economic substance of transactions is not the same as recharacterizing transactions: considering economic substance means looking beyond
the legal form of transactions in order to determine their purpose or efect. While
legal form is relevant, it is not determinative. As suggested below, the relevance
of economic substance can be discerned through undertaking a rigorous exercise
in statutory interpretation.

Economic Substance Under the Purposive Construction
of the Law and the Facts
Te abuse analysis under subsection 245(4) involves a determination of the purpose and rationale of the relevant provisions and a determination of whether an
avoidance transaction frustrates or defeats that purpose or rationale.62 Economic
substance, understood in terms of economic result or efect, is logically part of
the abuse analysis because, as the Supreme Court has consistently held, the abuse
inquiry is purposive and results-oriented. Surely it is not the form of an avoidance
transaction that matters: a transaction that is legally valid is subject to the abuse
analysis only when it lacks a primary economic or bona fde non-tax purpose in
the frst place.
Under a unifed purposive approach, the purpose and efect of a taxpayer’s transaction and the relevant statutory provisions are established by looking beyond 63 the
mere wording of the law or the documentation of the transactions. Tis is important because, in an abuse analysis, the ultimate question is whether the intended
purpose or efect of Parliament is defeated by the otherwise legally valid avoidance
transaction. As explained below, because Parliament expressed diferent purposes

62 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 44 (SCC).
63 Copthorne, supra note 13, at paragraph 47.
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through the use of diferent types of provisions, the typology and organic nature
of a specifc provision are important in the exercise of statutory interpretation.
ORGANIC INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC ENDS

Te Act uses legal concepts to achieve economic ends.64 It contains over 1 million
words and hundreds of provisions arranged in a particular manner to collectively
achieve Parliament’s intended purposes. It can be viewed as a “paradigmatic system
of rules.” 65 Because most of the provisions were drafted during a period when the
Act received a largely literal interpretation, many provisions were drafted in a
highly technical and detailed manner to ensure that the legislative purpose was
captured in the text. Tis drafting style and level of detail and specifcity (and
complexity), although justifed by the nature of the tasks that the Act is expected
to perform, makes deciphering legislative purpose a daunting task. Tis task might
be made less daunting by getting to the root of the legislative scheme through an
organic approach.
Organically speaking, sections 2 to 4 of the Act are the roots of the basic income
tax system in part I of the Act. Since 1972, the “tree” of income, within this system,
has two major trunks: income from a source ( paragraph 3(a)) and capital gains
( paragraph 3( b)). Each trunk has generated branches and stems in the provisions
of the Act, some of which are crossovers (such as provisions dealing with depreciable property: the capital cost is recognized in computing income under paragraph 3(a), but any increase in value is recognized under paragraph 3(b)). Although
most of these provisions are designed to measure annual income for each taxpayer,
some are designed to reduce or exempt income as tax expenditures. SAARs are
scattered through the Act as defensive mechanisms to protect the integrity of the
income tax system. As demonstrated in Copthorne, Triad Gestco, and Global Equity,
it is important to identify the organic scheme that underlies the specifc provisions
allegedly abused and to appreciate their type and role in the scheme.
Revenue-raising provisions are the raison d’être of the Act; their general purpose
is to raise revenue to meet the costs of government. Tey are facilitated or supported
by some technical relief rules, such as the rules relating to timing (rollover rules,
deferral rules, loss carryovers, and deemed dispositions). Te general purpose of
these technical rules is to address concerns about the lack of connection between
a taxpayer’s economic income and income as computed under the basic rules of
the Act on a per-person, per-year, and per-source basis. For example, the rollover

64 Judith Freedman, “Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament”
(2007) 123:1 Law Quarterly Review 53-90, at 54. See also Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein,
“Tax: Diferent, Not Exceptional” (2019) 71:4 Administrative Law Review 663-717, at 674-79.
65 David A. Weisbach, “Formalism in the Tax Law” (1999) 66:3 University of Chicago Law Review
860-86, at 860.
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rule under section 73, for transfers of property between spouses, recognizes the
reality that the two parties form one economic unit and that any gains or losses
accrued with respect to the property are realized on disposition by the unit. Te
overall objective of revenue-raising provisions is to measure an individual’s income
as closely as possible in terms of the economic ability to pay.
Tax-incentive provisions share the purpose of encouraging taxpayers to conduct
certain economic activities, such as purchasing an owner-occupied home, saving
through a registered retirement savings plan (RRSP) or tax-free savings account,
and subsidizing certain sectors of the economy. Also embedded in the Act are some
“negative tax” rules, such as the Canada child beneft and the refundable goods
and services tax/harmonized sales tax (GST/HST) tax credit. Teir purpose is to
provide means-tested income support to lower-income families; the Act is used
by Parliament simply to deliver these supports. Tese provisions have nothing to
do with raising revenue or forgiving taxes as a tax incentive.
SAARs all have the purpose of preventing specifc types of tax-avoidance
structures or transactions that could be contemplated or foreseen by the drafters;
they backstop the application of the revenue-raising and tax-incentive provisions
referred to above. As further discussed below, a SAAR can provide clues for discerning the purpose of a provision whose application a targeted transaction is designed
to avoid.
Te GAAR is a diferent type of provision. It is not self-executing, and it is
superimposed on other provisions. It is also one-sided, in that only the minister
can invoke it. Its purpose is to ensure that the purpose of other provisions is not
abused.

Revenue-Raising Provisions and the Expectation
of Economic Substance
Income as an Economic Concept
Te goal of revenue-raising provisions is to determine the amount of tax payable
by taxpayers. An income tax is ultimately a tax levied on individuals according to
their economic well-being or ability to pay.66 Because the amount of tax reduces
the taxpayer’s economic power to consume or save, taxpayers seek to use legal means
to minimize it.
Te Act does not defne “income.” Section 3 provides rules for determining
income: for example, income must come from a source; taxable capital gains are
treated as income; and annual income is a net concept because current-year losses
are deductible. As self-operating legal rules for a self-assessment system, these rules
66 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: Te Defnition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), at 59-80; and Carter report, supra note 19. For a
recent analysis, see John R. Brooks, “Te Defnitions of Income” (2018) 71:2 Tax Law Review
253-309.
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capture the economic income of taxpayers earned in the broadest possible range of
common situations. Tey are supported by detailed rules, in division B of part I
of the Act, for determining income from an ofce or employment,67 from a business
or property,68 from capital gains, and from “other” sources.
Te economic nature of income is evidenced by the wording of subsection 3(1)
of the 1917 IWTA, which was “largely taken from the US Revenue Act of 1913”; 69
it is the total of income from separate sources, such as “net annual proft or gain
or gratuity” as well as “wages, salary, or other fxed amount” and “interest, dividends or profts from money.” Tese amounts are captured by paragraph 3(a).
Capital gains became taxable in 1972 under paragraph 3( b). Other provisions in
the Act buttress the economic nature of income.70 As the Federal Court of Appeal
held in Triad Gestco and Global Equity, the language used in section 3 refects
economic income.

Economic Income Prescribed by Legal Rules
Te economic concept of income is articulated through rules that ft into the
overall inner workings and practical exigencies of the Act as a whole. For this
purpose, the Act draws on private law as well as on accepted accounting and
business practices. Tis “marriage of tax to economics” and the desire to provide
certainty and predictability have produced a normative preference for rules that
create a “crisp blueprint” for economic income.71 Some of these rules are drafted
like formulas and are highly prescriptive. Some basic rules use general legal concepts, such as “person” or “property,” to determine tax consequences (for example,
taxing each corporation as a taxpayer separate from its ultimate individual owners),
while other rules (typically SAARs) look through corporate personality or formal
ownership of property in order to properly determine which individual bears the
burden of progressive taxation.72 Ultimately, the Act uses legal concepts to achieve
economic ends. From a practical point of view, these rules produce a fnal amount
of tax owed by a taxpayer.
67 For example, sections 6 and 7 include fringe benefts and employee stock options in computing
income from an ofce or employment, and both provisions emphasize the economic value of the
beneft.
68 Even though section 3 does not defne income, its supporting rules, such as section 9, do.
Moreover, the notion of income is elaborated in cases such as Canderel, supra note 55; Ikea Ltd. v.
Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 196; and Toronto College Park Ltd. v. Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 183, where it
is stated that accounting principles and business practices are relevant in determining income
from a business.
69 Campbell and Raizenne, supra note 16, at 2:22-23.
70 For example, under section 6, any economic beneft derived by employees from their employment
is income.
71 See Abreu and Greenstein, supra note 64, at 690.
72 See the discussion of SAARs below, under the heading “SAARs and Targeted Economic Activity.”
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A holistic and organic approach to purposive interpretation can help reveal the
underlying object and purpose of a specifc provision of the Act. Te decisions in
Triad Gestco, Global Equity, and Pièces automobiles Lecavalier provide examples of
such an approach. In Pièces automobiles Lecavalier, for example, the debt-forgiveness
rule in section 80 was interpreted to refect an increase in the economic power of
the debtor when the debt was cancelled.73

Te Economic Substance of Transactions
In general, the basic revenue-raising provisions are intended to apply to common
or normal transactions in order to achieve the economic purposes of the Act. Tese
provisions are buttressed by rules, including SAARs, that function as standards that
require transactions to refect fair market value (FMV) or price and a reasonable
businessperson’s perspective.
Income and loss are two sides of the same economic coin, and therefore, given
that the Act does not tax artifcial income, it is logical to expect that the Act does
not recognize artifcial losses or transactions designed to produce artifcial losses.
Transactions that lack economic substance are not intended to be subject to
basic revenue-raising provisions and are prima facie abusive. Tis conclusion fnds
support in cases dealing with subsection 20(16) (Duncan and Landrus); 74 with
subsection 96(1) (Mathew, MacKay, 594710 British Columbia Ltd., and Oxford Properties);75 and with section 3 (Triad Gestco, 1207192 Ontario Ltd., Global Equity, and
Barrasso).76

Tax-Incentive Provisions and Targeted Economic Activity
Tax-incentive provisions are intended to promote social or economic objectives
unrelated to the usual raising of revenue. Tey result in the promotion of economic
goals: a sum of money, delivered through the tax system, nudges taxpayers to do
something that has a societal beneft. Te transfer of money that occurs through
the waiving of the tax otherwise payable is real, not fctional.
Typically, the intended activity is prescribed in the Act. Te purpose of taxincentive provisions may be more directly discernible from their wording than is
the case with revenue-raising provisions. Examples of such provisions include the
principal-residence exemption and deductions for RRSP contributions.
To date, no GAAR case has found that a tax-incentive provision has been abused.
Although the motivation for some surplus-stripping transactions, in cases such as

73 Pièces automobiles Lecavalier, supra note 44, at paragraphs 92 and 93.
74 Duncan, sub nom. Water’s Edge Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. Canada, 2002 FCA 291; and
Landrus, supra note 43.
75 MacKay v. Canada, 2008 FCA 105; Canada v. Oxford Properties Group Inc., 2018 FCA 30.
76 Barrasso v. Te Queen, 2014 TCC 156.
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McNichol,77 was to take advantage of the lifetime capital gains exemption, section 110.6 was not the provision that was found to have been abused.

SAARs and Targeted Economic Efect
Te Roles and Types of SAARs
Unlike revenue-raising provisions or tax-incentive provisions that help measure
income or give away otherwise taxable income, SAARs function as proverbial
antibodies that protect the intended purpose and efect of substantive provisions.78
Tey do not create new “terrain” or new rules.79 If the GAAR is a searchlight with
respect to the Act’s deeper purposes, SAARs function as personal fashlights that
illuminate the specifc path for discerning the legislative purpose embedded in the
words of the provisions of a statutory scheme.
Since legislative purpose is frequently not apparent from the bare words of
a specifc provision, a SAAR may ofer clues regarding the purpose of the legislative scheme or basic provision that it seeks to protect. Examples include the
anti-surplus-stripping purpose revealed by section 84.1 and the anti-loss-trading
purpose of subsection 111(5). Of greater relevance to this chapter is the fact
that some SAARs implicitly require transactions to have economic substance by
(1) referring to FMV or price (for example, sections 69 and 247); (2) imposing a
reasonableness standard (for example, section 67); or (3) requiring transactions
that give rise to creditable foreign income taxes to be reasonably expected to realize
an economic proft (for example, subsection 126(4.1)).
Te importance of SAARs is evident from their history and ubiquitous presence
in the Act. Te 1917 IWTA contained several SAARs, including subsection 3(2),
which is the original of the current section 247 and subsection 3(4)—which, in
turn, are the originals of the regime for integrating the taxation of privately held
corporations and their shareholders. It is difcult to fnd many signifcant tax
regimes in the Act that are not accompanied and supported by SAARs. By identifying uncommon transactions or flling the gaps between basic provisions, SAARs
provide certainty and keep the basic provisions “simple.”
With respect to drafting style, SAARs can generally be categorized as SAARs-asstandards or SAARs-as-rules. SAARs-as-standards are designed to express general
expectations of the Act. SAARs-as-rules are more “surgical,” targeting specifc types
of transactions or results that would otherwise defeat the purpose of basic provisions. SAARs-as-rules draw hard lines around the scope of their application, an
77 Infra note 99.
78 For a discussion of the relationship between SAARs and the GAAR, see Shawn D. Porter, “Te
Relationship Between the General Anti-Avoidance Rule and Specifc Anti-Avoidance Rules,” in
chapter 17 of this volume.
79 Weisbach, supra note 65, at 868 regards specifc rules as fner lines on the map to match the
underlying terrain in the topological map.
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example being paragraph 95(6)(b), which targets a particular transaction (that is,
the acquisition or disposition of shares in a non-resident corporation).80 SAARsas-standards, by contrast, draw fuzzy or dotted lines and invite the judiciary to
brighten the lines or connect the dots; they are closer in nature to a GAAR.

Economic Substance Implied by SAARs-as-Standards
SAARs-as-standards include sections 67, 69, 247, and former section 245. Tey
generally defer to the market as a benchmark for determining the amount of
revenue or expenses for computing income for tax purposes.
Te reasonableness standard in section 67 can be traced to subsection 6(2) of
the 1932-33 IWTA,81 which authorized the minister to disallow as an expense the
portion of any salary, bonus, or commission exceeding a reasonable amount for
the services performed. Tis rule was expanded in 1940 to any business expense
incurred in respect of any transaction or operation that unduly or artifcially reduced
income.82 In 1948, the more generally worded subsection 12(2) replaced subsection 6(2):

In computing income, no deduction shall be made in respect of an outlay or expense
otherwise deductible except to the extent that the outlay or expense was reasonable in
the circumstances.83

Subsection 12(2) became section 67 in the 1972 Act, with minor modifcations.84 Te reasonableness standard has been interpreted by the courts to be a
“reasonable business person” test according to which “no reasonable business person

80 For an interpretation of this SAAR, see Lehigh Cement, supra note 36. In Landrus, supra note 43,
at paragraph 41, the Federal Court of Appeal stated: “I agree with the appellant that the fact that
specifc anti-avoidance provisions can be demonstrated not to be applicable to a particular
situation does not, in and of itself, indicate that the result was condoned by Parliament. . . .
However, where it can be shown that an anti-avoidance provision has been carefully crafted to
include some situations and exclude others, it is reasonable to infer that Parliament chose to limit
their scope accordingly.”
81 Income War Tax Act, SC 1932-33, c. 41 (herein referred to as “the 1932-33 IWTA”),
subsection 6(2) read: “Te Minister may disallow as an expense the whole or any portion of any
salary, bonus, commission or director’s fee which in his opinion is in excess of what is reasonable
for the services performed.”
82 Subsection 6(2) read: “Te Minister may disallow any expense which he in his discretion may
determine to be in excess of what is reasonable or normal for the business carried on by the
taxpayer, or which was incurred in respect of any transaction or operation which in his opinion
has unduly or artifcially reduced the income.”
83 Income Tax Act, SC 1948, c. 52 (herein referred to as “1948 Act”), subsection 12(2).
84 Section 67 of the 1972 Act read: “In computing income, no deduction shall be made in respect of
an outlay or expense in respect of which any amount is otherwise deductible under this Act,
except to the extent that the outlay or expense was reasonable in the circumstances.”
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would have contracted to pay such an amount having only the business considerations of the [taxpayer] in mind.” 85 In other words, business reality or normal
business practices are relevant.
Sections 69 and 247 impose an FMV or price standard for testing the acceptability of the price of a transaction between non-arm’s-length parties.86 Tis
standard presumes that the market price is the most reliable and observable basis
for computing income. Where the price is set for non-market reasons, the efect
of that price manipulation for tax purposes is replaced by the FMV standard. Tis
standard originated in subsection 3(2) of the 1917 IWTA.87
Former subsection 245(1),88 which was repealed when the GAAR was enacted,
imposes an anti-artifciality standard: artifcial deductions could be disregarded in
computing income for tax purposes. Tis standard can be traced back to section 137
of the 1952 Act, and before that to section 125 of the 1948 Act and section 32A of
the 1940 IWTA.89 Te notion of “artifciality” refers to the “nature of the transaction,” 90 since the price of the transaction is already covered by the FMV standard.
Te concept of an artifcial transaction is interpreted by the courts to refer to a
“simulated” or “fctitious” transaction 91 or a transaction that is “unnatural” or “not
in accordance with normality.” 92 “Natural” or “normal” transactions are presumably
common transactions that take place in the market, or transactions with economic
substance and/or efect.

85 Gabco Ltd. v. MNR, 68 DTC 5210 (Ex. Ct.), at paragraph 52.
86 FMV is interpreted as “the highest price an asset might reasonably be expected to bring if sold by
the owner in the normal method applicable to the asset in question in the ordinary course of
business in a market not exposed to any undue stresses and composed of willing buyers and sellers
dealing at arm’s length and under no compulsion to buy or sell”; see Henderson v. MNR, [1973]
CTC 636 (FCTD), at 644.
87 Subsection 3(2) of the 1917 IWTA became section 23 of the 1927 IWTA, and then became
section 16 of the 1943-44 IWTA. In 1948, section 17 was introduced to provide more details
regarding cross-border purchase and sale transactions and in-kind corporate distributions. Tis
provision became section 18 of the 1952 Act and subsections 69(2) and (3) of the 1972 Act.
Section 69 extended the FMV standard to dispositions of property to facilitate the newly introduced
capital gains tax regime. In 1998, section 247 was enacted to replace subsections 69(2) and (3).
88 Former subsection 245(1) read: “In computing income for the purposes of this Act, no deduction
may be made in respect of a disbursement or an expense made or incurred in respect of a
transaction or operation that, if allowed, would unduly or artifcially reduce income.”
89 Subsection 32A(1) of the 1940 IWTA stated: “Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Act,
the Treasury Board may in its discretion determine that any transaction has artifcially reduced or
would artifcially reduce taxation and has no reasonable business purpose other than that of
avoiding or minimizing taxation hereunder and that no deduction shall be allowed with respect to
any expense or disbursement resulting there-from.”
90 Dodge, supra note 3, at 6 (emphasis added).
91 Spur Oil Ltd. v. Te Queen, 81 DTC 5168 (FCA).
92 Consolidated-Bathurst Limited v. Te Queen, 87 DTC 5001 (FCA).
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Efect-Over-Form Under SAARs-as-Rules
SAARs-as-rules include provisions that address specifc types of tax-planning
structures that are designed to achieve, among other aims, tax arbitrage, income
or loss shifting, the transformation of a transaction’s character, the manipulation
of timing, and the manipulation of tax attributes. Examples of such SAARs and
the “hinted-at” legislative purpose of the underlying substantive provisions or
schemes include

• Anti-tax-arbitrage rules. Examples include section 20.3,93 which refects
paragraph 20(1)(c)’s purpose of limiting interest deductions to money
borrowed to earn income from a business or property, as opposed to capital
gains; section 56.4,94 which refects the broad purpose of “source” in section 3 and distinguishes between capital gains and income from a source;
and regulation 1100(1.1),95 dealing with specifed leasing property, which
refects the CCA regime’s purpose of allowing deductions to owners and users
of depreciable property, but not to lessors who function as lenders.
• Anti-shifting rules. Examples include subsection 56(2) (indirect payments),
sections 74.1 and 74.2 (attribution rules), and section 124.1 (tax on split
income rules), which refect the Act’s purpose (especially subsections 2(1)
and 117(2)) of imposing progressive taxation on an individual basis and of
treating as the taxpayer the person who has earned the income; subsection
111(5), which refects the purpose of computing the taxpayer’s taxable
income (on a multi-year basis) in respect of the business activity of that
taxpayer (that is, a policy against corporate loss-trading); and paragraph
85(1)(e.2), which refects the purpose of anti-shifting through value-shifting
in the course of a rollover. Te frst anti-shifting rule was subsection 4(4)
of the 1917 IWTA, which recognized the validity of gifts between spouses,
but attributed the income from the gifted property to the transferor.96
• Anti-timing-manipulation rules. Examples include subparagraph 40(2)(g)(i),
which refects the purpose of recognizing losses on the actual (not paper)

93 Introduced in response to the tax-arbitrage transactions known as “weak-currency loans,”
approved in Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 SCR 622.
94 Introduced in response to cases such as Fortino et al. v. Te Queen, 2000 DTC 6060 (FCA); and
Manrell v. Canada, 2003 FCA 128.
95 Introduced in 1989; see Israel Mida and Kathleen Stewart, “Te Capital Cost Allowance System”
(1995) 43:5 Canadian Tax Journal 1245-64, at 1257.
96 Subsection 4(4) of 1917 IWTA read: “A person who, after the frst day of August, 1917, has
reduced his income by the transfer or assignment of any real or personal, movable or immovable
property, to such person’s wife or husband, as the case may be, or to any member of the family of
such person, shall, nevertheless, be liable to be taxed as if such transfer or assignment had not
been made, unless the Minister is satisfed that such transfer or assignment was not made for the
purpose of evading the taxes imposed under this Act or any part thereof.”
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disposition of property; and subsection 18(13), which refects the purpose
of not recognizing income or capital gain where property is disposed of but
remains within the same economic unit.
• Anti-character-transformation rules. Examples include subsections 212(3.6)
and (3.7), which treat interest as dividends or royalties for withholding tax
purposes; paragraph 258(3)(a), which deems dividends on term-preferred
shares to be interest; and sections 84.1 and 212.1, which refect the purpose
of taxing distributions of corporate after-tax proft as dividends as opposed
to taxing them as capital gains or returns of capital (surplus-stripping rules).
Te earliest surplus-stripping rule was likely subsection 3(9) of the 1924
IWTA, which deemed a distribution of property to be the payment of a
dividend to the extent that the company had undistributed income. Recent
regimes specifcally aimed at character-transformation arrangements, such
as back-to-back arrangements to convert the character of payments, were
introduced to address “synthetic” arrangements.
• Lookthrough legal-fction rules. Examples include section 91, which imputes
foreign accrual property income earned by a controlled foreign afliate to
the resident shareholders for tax purposes, refecting the Act’s purpose of
taxing resident taxpayers on their economic income irrespective of the “legal
separation” of such income from the taxpayers through legal intermediation
(such as the use of a foreign corporation); subsections 125(2) and (3), which
limit the beneft of the small business deduction to a group of associated
corporations, thus refecting the Act’s purpose of treating a corporate group
as an economic unit for this purpose; and section 186, which imposes a
refundable tax on dividends received by private corporations, refecting the
purpose of treating a private corporation and its shareholders as a fscal unit
for the purpose of imposing progressive taxation on personal income.97 Te
earliest lookthrough rule was subsection 3(4) of the 1917 IWTA, which
imputed the distributed income of a corporation (as well as any syndicate,
trust, association, or partnership) to the individual owner for the purpose
of the super-tax, unless the retained proft was “not in excess of what is
reasonably required for the purposes of the business.”
• Substance-over-form rules. Examples include paragraph 12(1)(g), which treats
amounts paid for the use of or production from property as rent or royalties

97 For more on the concept of fscal unity, see J. Scott Wilkie, “Tree Spirits of Canadian Corporate
Income Tax: Te Relic, the Remnant, and the Refection,” in Income Tax at 100 Years, supra
note 15, 8:1-32. Te idea that some SAARs function as “bridges” between the notion of the rule
of law (including the right of taxpayers to take advantage of legislative ambiguities and deference
to legal fctions) and the idea that the Act measures the economic income of an economic unit
(such as members of a corporate group) was inspired by a student paper: Jenna Clark, “Bridges
over Troubled Waters: Legislative and Judicial Links Between the Legal Form of the Corporation
and the Economic Reality of the Corporate Group” (on fle with the author).
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even if the form of the transaction is a sale; subsection 16(1), which treats a
sale transaction as having an embedded lending transaction; and subsection
18(4), which denies the deduction of interest on non-resident shareholder
loans that exceed the specifed debt-to-equity ratio and treats the excessive
interest as dividends. Tese rules have a long history. For example, paragraph
12(1)(g) can be traced to paragraph 3(f ) of the 1934 IWTA, and subsection
16(1) goes back to subsection 3(2) of the 1942-43 IWTA.
SAARs tend to target uncommon transactions so that these transactions do not
become common transactions that fall within the scope of the basic provisions.
For example, sale and leaseback transactions in the nature of fnancing are not
treated as common purchase and sale transactions subject to the CCA scheme.98
Te purpose of a SAAR is to ensure that the intended purpose or efect of the
“protected” basic provisions is not frustrated by uncommon transactions.

Te Role of SAARs in GAAR Cases
Close to half of the GAAR cases listed in the appendix to this chapter, including
three Supreme Court decisions, involve the abuse of a SAAR. Te abuse is shown
by the avoidance transaction’s circumventing the application of the SAAR (for
example, Copthorne) or turning the SAAR on its head (for example, Mathew and
Lipson). Te common thread in these cases is that, in the absence of the GAAR,
the targeted efect of a SAAR would be neutralized by the avoidance transaction.
In the GAAR cases involving a SAAR, the courts focused on the efect of these
transactions. One group of such cases deals with surplus-stripping transactions
that are designed to convert pre-taxed corporate income into capital or capital
gains. Tese cases include McNichol, RMM, Nadeau, Desmarais, Descarries, and
Pomerleau.99 Copthorne may not be viewed as a typical surplus-stripping case, but
it efectively is one. In Copthorne, Rothstein J stated that the amounts that may
be extracted by shareholders from a corporation without tax are limited to the
PUC, which represents after-tax income or tax-paid funds.100 Pre-tax funds identifed by sections 84.1 and 212.1 and by the parenthesis in subsection 87(3) must
reduce the PUC of shares under subsection 89(1) to prevent such funds from being
treated as tax-free capital.101 In these cases, the result of the avoidance transactions
was found to be abusive because the transactions defeated the purpose of these
98 Canada, Department of Finance, 1976 Budget, Budget Paper C, May 25, 1976, at 25. See also
Mida and Stewart, supra note 95, at 1257.
99 McNichol et al. v. Te Queen, 97 DTC 111 (TCC); RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al. v. Te
Queen, 97 DTC 302 (TCC); Nadeau v. Te Queen, 99 DTC 324 (TCC); Desmarais v. Te
Queen, 2006 TCC 44; Descarries v. Te Queen, 2014 TCC 75; Pomerleau v. Canada, 2018 FCA
129.
100 Copthorne, supra note 13, at paragraph 95.
101 Pomerleau, supra note 99, at paragraph 64; Copthorne, supra note 13, at paragraphs 93-96.
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rules. More fundamentally, once income is earned by a corporation (on behalf of
its shareholders), it should be taxed as income in the hands of the shareholder,
and the corporate fction or legal arrangements should not be used to turn taxable
income into tax-free capital.
Another group of GAAR cases involving SAARs dealt with loss-limitation rules
(for example, subsection 18(13)) and anti-income-shifting rules (such as sections
74.1 and 74.2, and subsection 75(2)). Tese rules are intended to prevent the
shifting of losses or income between members of the same economic unit but were
used to shift income in Mathew, MacKay, Lipson, and Fiducie fnancière Satoma.102
For example, in Mathew, the Supreme Court considered the “combined efect of
the partnership rules and subsection 18(13)—to disallow taxpayers to preserve
and transfer unrealized losses to arm’s length parties” 103 —and found that the efect
of the avoidance transactions contradicted that intended efect. In Lipson, LeBel J
considered the overall result of the series of transactions that included an avoidance
transaction—(1) the deduction of the interest payments on a mortgage, (2) the
efect of subsection 73(1) to “facilitate interspousal transfers of property without
triggering immediate tax consequences,” 104 and (3) the purpose of subsection
74.1(1))—and he found that section 74.1 was intended to prevent spouses from
reducing tax by taking advantage of their non-arm’s-length relationship with
respect to interspousal transfers of property. Tus, section 74.1 was intended to
prevent the efect of the avoidance transactions.

Revisiting Canada Trustco: An Example of Considering
Economic Substance Trough Organic Interpretation
Recap
Below, on the basis of the recent developments in the GAAR jurisprudence and
Parliament’s intention in enacting section 245, this chapter makes the case for
giving economic substance an enhanced role in the abuse analysis through a
rigorous, disciplined, and organic interpretation of statutory provisions and a
unifed approach to construing both the law and the facts. To illustrate how the
proposed approach might be applied, I consider the Canada Trustco case.105
Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. (CTMC) carried on business as a mortgage lender.
In 1996, CTMC entered into an arrangement that included the following steps:
• CTMC took a non-recourse loan of Cdn$97.35 million from the Royal Bank
of Canada (RBC) at an interest rate of 7.5 percent.
102
103
104
105

Fiducie fnancière Satoma v. Canada, 2018 FCA 74.
Mathew, supra note 22, at paragraph 37.
Lipson, supra note 23, at paragraph 31.
Tis part of the chapter has benefted tremendously from the insights of Scott Wilkie, with respect
to both the transactions and the statutory provisions.
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• CTMC used the borrowed money, together with some of its own funds, to
purchase trailers from TLI (a US resident) for Cdn$120 million.
• CTMC then leased the trailers to MAIL (a UK-resident company) at the rate
of 8.5 percent, with an option to purchase.
• MAIL subleased the trailers to TLI.
• TLI prepaid all amounts due to MAIL (that is, Cdn$116.4 million) under
the sublease.
• MAIL deposited Cdn$97.35 million with RBC (defeasance arrangement) and
paid about Cdn$19 million to RBC Jersey, as trustee, with a pledge that the
bond purchased with the Cdn$19 million would be used as security for
MAIL’s obligations to pay rent.
• CTMC assigned its rental payments to RBC as payments under the loan.
For tax purposes, CTMC claimed CCA of $31 million with respect to the
trailers against rental income of Cdn$36 million in 1996, and it claimed CCA of
Cdn$46 million against Cdn$51 million of rental income in 1997. When the
interest deduction was considered, CTMC had a loss from the arrangement and
that loss was used to ofset income from other sources. Te issue was whether the
CCA deductions should be denied under the GAAR.
Tirteen judges in the Tax Court, Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme
Court agreed that the GAAR did not apply in this case. Te decisions do not single
out any specifc transaction as an avoidance transaction or any specifc provision
of the Act that was abused. Instead, all of the transactions in the arrangement or
series seem to have been treated as avoidance transactions, and the CCA provisions
were interpreted and found not to have been abused by the transactions.

Economic Substance of the Transactions
Do the transactions in Canada Trustco have economic substance? First, since
the Canada Trustco decision in 2005, the Supreme Court has clarifed in Lipson
and Copthorne that a specifc transaction needs to be identifed as an avoidance
transaction. Such a transaction may result in a tax beneft on its own or as part
of a series of transactions that results in a tax beneft. Te purpose test is applied
to the specifc transaction, not to the series. As shown by Miller J’s fnding in
Canada Trustco, an investment that is commercially proftable overall does not
preclude one step in the arrangement from being an avoidance transaction. In
other words, no dichotomy exists between an overall economic purpose of a series
of transactions and a primary tax-avoidance purpose of a specifc transaction in
the series. Assuming that one or more transactions (such as the lease, sub-lease,
and pre-payment) are the pinpointed transactions, it would be easy to conclude
that no primary economic purpose exists for such transactions.
As this case shows, real commercial transactions often have an economic purpose
as well as a tax purpose. With respect to sale-leaseback transactions, Miller J found
that the tax treatment is “not extraneous to the commercial venture, but intrinsic
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to it.” 106 Tus, it is critical to weigh the evidence objectively to discern whether
obtaining the tax beneft was the primary purpose; if, as in this case, the tax benefts
were the primary reason for CTMC to enter into the arrangement, the purpose
test is met.
What about the economic result of the avoidance transactions? Apart from the
tax savings, how was CTMC’s economic position changed by these transactions?
CTMC invested about Cdn$23 million of its own funds ( plus transaction costs)
in this arrangement; its rental income more or less ofset the cost of the loan from
RBC, and the loan was a non-recourse loan covered by a debt defeasance with
prepayment from TLI. Te Cdn$23 million investment was more than recovered
from the CCA deduction in 1996 alone. No evidence suggests that the real source
of proft was something other than the tax deductions.
In efect, the arrangement is not like an ordinary sale-leaseback transaction that
enables the lessor and lessee to share the beneft of CCA and interest deductions
and thus lowers the cost of fnancing the acquisition of business assets. An ordinary
sale-leaseback would have involved CTMC purchasing the trailers from a trucking
company or from a company whose principal business was leasing and then leasing
the trailers back to that company. Te transactions in Canada Trustco were not
ordinary sale-leaseback transactions because of the TLI prepayment, the debt
defeasance, the RBC non-recourse fnancing, TLI as a non-resident corporation,
and the circuitous nature of the arrangement. Te defeasance of CTMC’s purchase
obligation was pre-arranged to ensure that CTMC would not have to use its own
funds to pay for the trailers. Because most of the purchase price was, by design,
recycled to CTMC from the outset, the Cdn$120 million cost that was claimed
to be the basis for the CCA deductions was for the most part fctitious.
Te efect of the transactions, for tax purposes, was that CTMC “unlocked” the
value of CCA deductions that were not available even to TLI, the original owner
and actual user of the trailers, because TLI was not a taxpayer resident or carrying
on business in Canada. Te efect was the same as the result sought by the taxpayer
in Duncan107—claiming CCA deductions in respect of a foreign capital cost. In
Duncan, the historical cost of a computer in the United States was “imported”
into the Canadian tax system for CCA purposes, and that result was found to be
abusive. In Canada Trustco, the Cdn$120 million FMV of TLI’s trailers used by TLI
in its ordinary leasing business became the basis for CTMC’s CCA deductions.

An Organic Interpretation of the Statutory Scheme for CCA
In Canada Trustco, without identifying any specifc CCA provisions other than
paragraph 20(1)(a), the courts construed the CCA provisions as a whole and
focused on the meaning of “cost.” A more rigorous construction, under the organic
106 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 53 (TCC).
107 Duncan, supra note 74.

320 / Te General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Past, Present, and Future

approach proposed in this chapter, would have identifed (1) a specifc provision
relied on by the taxpayer in obtaining the tax beneft, (2) the CCA scheme, and
(3) the type of provisions in the scheme, and it would have situated this scheme
in the broader context of computing income from a business or property.
Te CCA scheme comprises (1) a basic provision, (2) supporting technical rules,
(3) SAARs, and (4) tax incentives, which are arranged in the following hierarchy:
1) A basic rule: paragraph 20(1)(a) allows a deduction for a portion of the cost
of depreciable property owned by a taxpayer in computing proft, and it
overrides the prohibition on the deduction of capital expenditures in paragraph 18(1)(b).
2) Supporting rules:
a) Regulations 1100(1) and 1100(2) specify details for determining the
maximum amount of CCA deductible each year on a class basis.
b) Subsections 13(21) and 248(1) and section 54 defne relevant terms
used in the rules.
c) Subsections 13(1) and 20(16) reconcile the amount of actual loss in
the value of the property and the CCA deductions claimed in previous
years.
3) SAARs, including:
a) Sections 67 and 247, to whose reasonableness standard the amount
of the “cost” is subject.
b) Regulation 1100(11), regarding rental property (limiting CCA deductions to the rental income derived by a taxpayer so that CCA deductions
do not become tax shelters).
c) Regulations 1100(15) to (19), regarding leasing property (limiting the
total CCA deductions to the total leasing income derived by a taxpayer).
d ) Regulation 1100(1.1), regarding specifed leasing property ( limiting
CCA deductions to the amount that would have been a repayment of
principal had the lease been a loan and had the lease payments been
blended payments of principal and interest; the notional principal
repayment is determined by frst calculating the notional interest under
regulation 4302).108

108 Te lessor is entitled to deduct CCA measured with reference to the principal portion of a
Canada bond, and otherwise includes the full amount of the rental payments (both the capital
and interest components), reducing its income by a capital amount meant to replicate the
repayment of the principal amount of borrowed money. Because the lessee pays and deducts rent,
the result is more or less in balance: the lessee is treated as having fnanced the acquisition of an
asset that it “owns” and that depreciates, and the lessor is treated as a lender of borrowed money.
An election under section 16.1 is available to the lessee to deduct CCA and interest instead of the
lease payments.
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4) Tax incentives, such as the following:
a) A rate of 100 percent for CCA with respect to zero-emission vehicles
(class 54 and class 55).
b) Regulation 1100(1.13) excludes “exempt property” from the specifed
leasing property rule in regulation 1100(1.1); trailers and light trucks
are included in the list of exempt property.
Te CCA scheme is part of the system used for computing income from business
or property under section 9. Section 9, in turn, supports the application of section 3, which in turn supports the charging rule in section 2.
What is the purpose and rationale of the CCA scheme? Noël J captured the
essential purpose of the CCA scheme in Duncan:
[T]he capital cost allowance system is intended to recognize over time costs incurred to
acquire capital assets actually used to earn income within the meaning of paragraph
18(1)(a) and (b), and . . . the “recapture” and “terminal loss” provisions are intended to
adjust the aggregate deduction so recognized when subsequent events demonstrate that
the asset has been over or under depreciated.
Tere can be no doubt that the object and spirit of the relevant provisions is to
provide for the recognition of money spent to acquire qualifying assets to the extent
that they are consumed in the income-earning process under the Act.109

By using expressions such as assets “actually used to earn income” and “consumed in the income earning process,” Noël J conveyed a sense of the business
reality found in a typical situation where an owner of assets is also the user of the
assets in the process of earning income.
Within the CCA scheme, there is a subsidiary scheme for sale-leaseback transactions. In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court refers to this subsidiary scheme
without much elaboration.110 Sale-leaseback transactions are subject to SAARs
because, in efect, they transfer CCA deductions from the lessee/user to the lessor/
owner. Tis type of transfer of a tax attribute occurs where the CCA deductions
are not valuable to the user (for example, where the user is in a loss position or is
a tax-exempt entity). Te leasing property rules specifed in regulation 1100(1.1)
efectively deny the CCA deduction to the lessor/owner and treat the lessor/owner
as a lender.
Te “exempt property” rules in regulation 1100(1.13) are in the nature of tax
incentives and were critical to the design of the tax arrangement in Canada Trustco.
In this case, trailers were acquired by CTMC because they are exempt from the
SAARs applicable to specifed leasing property. What is the purpose and rationale
of this tax incentive? What is the targeted activity to be subsidized? Historical
context provides some clues.
109 Duncan, supra note 74, at paragraphs 41 and 44.
110 Canada Trustco, supra note 5, at paragraph 74 (SCC).
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• On June 6, 1988, the minister of fnance, with the agreement of the minister’s provincial and territorial counterparts, announced in a news release
(no. 88-69) a moratorium on the practice of sale and leaseback transactions
by tax-exempt entities. Previously, it had become common for tax-exempt
entities to sell their property to taxable entities and then immediately lease
the property back. Tax deductions that would not have been available to
the tax-exempt entity, such as CCA, were then claimed by the taxable lessor,
even though the lessee retained possession and use of the property.111
• On April 27, 1989, the federal budget and the notice of ways and means
motion announced measures to address sale and leaseback transactions
without any exception for trucks and trailers.112
• Representations by the Canadian Truck Renting and Leasing Association and
Canadian Truck Equipment Association during the consideration of the bill
by the House of Commons sought an exemption from the proposed rules
in order to save Canadian jobs in the trucking industry: in their view, the
proposed rules would drive customers to obtain equipment from US sources
and would make the Canadian trucking industry less competitive.113
• Ofcials from the Department of Finance met with representatives of the
trucking industry and reported to the House of Commons on December 15,
1989 that the proposed rules would be redrafted to alleviate the negative
impact on small businesses.114
• On February 2, 1990, the Department of Finance released draft income tax
regulations to include exemptions for trucks and trailers.115
Tis summary of the legislative history suggests that the purpose of exempting
trailers from the specifed leasing property rules was to subsidize Canadian businesses and save Canadian jobs.

Considering Economic Substance in the Abuse Analysis
Can it be said that economic substance—in terms of an economic purpose or an
economic result—is intended by the CCA scheme in general, and by the SAARs
and tax-incentive provisions in particular?
First, the CCA scheme is part of the system for determining proft or loss under
section 9 of the Act. Proft and loss are economic outcomes measured by legal
concepts that refer to widely accepted business and accounting principles (as noted
111 Millie Goodman and Deborah L. Ort, “Checklist” (1988) 36:3 Canadian Tax Journal 769-824.
112 Canada, Department of Finance, 1989 Budget, Budget Papers, April 27, 1989 (www.budget.gc.ca/
pdfarch/1989-pap-eng.pdf ).
113 Bill C-28: frst reading on October 11, 1989 and second reading on November 23, 1989.
114 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, December 15, 1989, at 6970.
115 “Revised Draft Regulations on Leasing Released” (1990) 24 CGA Magazine, at 6.
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in, for example, Canderel and Global Equity). Te SAARs-as-standards in sections 67,
69, and 247 reinforce this point. Terefore, transactions that give rise to CCA
deductions should be expected to have economic substance. In Duncan, the Federal
Court of Appeal stated that subsection 20(16) refects a real economic loss and
that CCA deductions and terminal loss deductions are intended to match “the
actual cost of the depreciable property to the taxpayer.” 116 In Landrus, the terminal
loss was recognized because the legal arrangements that gave rise to the loss brought
about material changes, both in terms of risks and benefts.117
Te SAAR with respect to specifed leasing property targets fnancial leases
and denies the lessor/lender the tax treatment designed for an owner or user of
depreciable property. It efectively substitutes the tax consequences of a lending
transaction for those of a fnancial lease because the economic results of a fnancial
lease are the same as those of a lending transaction.
In entering into the transactions, CTMC relied on the tax incentive for fnancial
leases of trailers. Assuming that this tax incentive was intended to assist the Canadian trucking industry, the efect of CTMC’s transaction was to beneft a foreign
taxpayer (TLI) and CTMC, which, as a fnancial institution, was not engaged in
the Canadian trucking industry.
To conclude, a reconsideration of Canada Trustco clarifes three main points
about the role of economic substance in the abuse analysis under subsection
245(4). First, the legislative purpose and intent of the relevant provision or provisions of the Act should be determined through a disciplined and rigorous process
of statutory interpretation, as exemplifed by the Copthorne, Triad Gestco, and
Global Equity decisions. Using the GAAR to shed light on the underlying purpose
and rationale of a provision is not the same as using the GAAR to “make” law. Te
GAAR is not intended to be a stand-alone substantive rule. In Canada Trustco,
the GAAR did not empower the courts to “legislate” the meaning of cost by reading
in a concept of “economic risk.” Instead, the GAAR required the courts to determine
the purpose and efect of the CCA provisions. As shown above, these provisions
include diferent types of rules—namely, basic rules, SAARs, and tax incentives,
each of which has diferent, albeit connected, purposes. It is overly simplistic to
generalize about all of these provisions in cases where one specifc type of provision
was relied on by the taxpayer in designing an avoidance transaction.
Second, as with the CCA regime, Parliament uses diferent types of provisions
to achieve specifc purposes or efects. Te typology of provisions can provide clues
to their interpretation. Te “task is to discern the meaning of the provision’s text
using all of the objective clues available to us.” 118 Economic substance, understood
in terms of a primary non-tax purpose and non-tax result, is contemplated by
116 Duncan, supra note 74, at paragraphs 39 and 40.
117 Landrus, supra note 43, at paragraph 57.
118 Lehigh Cement, supra note 36, at paragraph 44.
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Parliament through revenue-raising provisions such as paragraph 20(1)(a), and it
is backstopped by SAARs such as the specifed leasing property rules. A specifc
economic efect is generally intended by tax-incentive provisions, such as an
exemption for trucks and trailers.
Tird, the role of economic substance becomes more clear when the meaning
of “avoidance transaction” under subsection 245(3) is considered alongside the
meaning of “abuse” under subsection 245(4). Subsection 245(3) explicitly refers
to the “purpose” of transactions. Te two-step analysis sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in determining abuse emphasizes the result or efect of the impugned
avoidance transaction. If the efect is artifcial (that is, if it is not economically
efective or realistic in the real world ), such as the infation of PUC in Copthorne
or the infation of CCA in Duncan, abuse is evident. Parliament has embedded
enough clues in the Act for the courts to determine that the PUC and CCA rules
are intended to have real economic efect. Terefore, transactions that seek to take
advantage of these rules should be expected to have economic, as opposed to mere
paper or fctitious, efects.
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12
Te Determination of the Tax
Consequences When the General
Anti-Avoidance Rule Applies
Chris Sprysak*

Introduction
As noted in chapter 5, once the three prerequisites for the application of the general
anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) have been established—namely, (1) a “tax beneft” that
results from (2) an “avoidance transaction” that (3) misuses or abuses the object,
spirit, and purpose of one or more provisions of the Income Tax Act 1 —subsection
245(2) provides that
the tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax beneft that, but for this section, would result, directly or
indirectly, from that transaction or from a series of transactions that includes that
transaction.

For ease of reference, this step is referred to in this chapter as a “GAAR determination.”
Subsection 245(1) defnes “tax consequences” broadly in relation to the person
afected by a GAAR determination: “the amount of income, taxable income, or
taxable income earned in Canada of, tax or other amount payable by or refundable
to the person under this Act, or any other amount that is relevant for the purposes
of computing that amount.” Subsection 245(5) provides four examples of possible
GAAR determinations that could constitute a reasonable tax consequence:
Without restricting the generality of subsection (2), and notwithstanding any other
enactment,

* Associate professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
1 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”). Unless otherwise stated,
statutory references in this chapter are to the Act.
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